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INTRODUCTION 
At Southern Utah University, Kourt Osborn, a transgender1 stu-
dent, was denied a dorm room because of his gender identity.2  Born 
as a female, Osborn, who identifies as a male, applied to live in the 
male dorms.  The University determined that Osborn could live in 
the men’s dormitory only with physician supervision of his hormone 
treatment, therapist acknowledgment of his Gender Identity Disor-
der, and official documentation of sexual reassignment surgery.3  Os-
born was told that the failure to present these three items would re-
sult in a denial of male housing.  Furthermore, Osborn was also 
denied the option of female housing.4  Osborn filed a formal griev-
ance, to which Dean O’Driscoll, assistant to the University’s President 
and the University’s spokesman, responded that the school was not 
discriminating against transgender students, but following a policy 
that aims to ensure that all students feel safe and comfortable in on-
campus housing.5  O’Driscoll admitted that proof of gender is not 
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. Political Science and Spanish, 2006, 
Duke University.  Thanks to Professor Anita Allen and Erin Cross of Penn’s LGBT Center for their 
helpful feedback and suggestions.  Special thanks to the late Professor C. Edwin Baker for his invalu-
able comments and guidance and for inspiring me throughout law school.  My appreciation also goes 
out to the members of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law for their diligent work.  
Finally, gratitude to my parents Bruce and Ruth Pomerantz and my sister Jessica for their encourage-
ment and support. 
   1  This Comment will use transgender as an “umbrella term” that includes “transsexuals, 
transvestites, cross-dressers, drag queens and drag kings, . . . intersexed people, bigen-
dered people, and others who . . . ‘challenge the boundaries of sex and gender.’”  Shan-
non Minter, Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay Rights?  Getting Real About Transgender Inclusion in 
the Gay Rights Movement, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 589, 589 n.4 (2000) (quoting LESLIE 
FEINBERG, TRANSGENDER WARRIORS:  MAKING HISTORY FROM JOAN OF ARC TO RUPAUL, at x 
(1996)).
 2 Scott Jaschik, Gender Status and Single-Sex Dorms, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Dec. 20, 2007, 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/12/20/transgender. 
 3 Matt Comer, Breaking:  Transgender Student Denied Campus Housing at Public Utah College, 
INTERSTATEQ, Dec. 14, 2007, http://www.interstateq.com/archives/2473/. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Jaschik, supra note 2. 
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required of all students; only transgender students must provide writ-
ten medical proof.6  In response to the University’s statement that 
they only offer male or female student housing, Osborn stated that it 
was “archaic to believe people of different genders can’t live in an 
apartment together.”7  Osborn felt “dehumanized, degraded, demor-
alized.”8
What happens when transgender and non-transgender worlds col-
lide?  What happens when these worlds converge in the context of an 
individual’s most intimate space, the home?  Kourt Osborn’s experi-
ence reveals the unfortunate story of a college student denied the 
opportunity to live in a college residence hall—an integral social part 
of the college experience.  It appears that the University acted on the 
premise that other students would not feel comfortable living with a 
transgender individual.9
The fear and uncertainty surrounding the transgender experience 
result in part from limited public exposure to individuals in the 
transgender community.  The current increase in transgender visibil-
ity and university housing requests from transgender students neces-
sitate a reevaluation of campus housing policies to ensure that all 
students have safe and comfortable housing options.10  University-
mandated, gender-based housing policies force transgender students 
into gendered rooming situations based on biological sex, instead of 
gender identification.  Harassment of transgender individuals is not 
an isolated event at school, but an ongoing epidemic.11  Recognition 
 6 Matt Comer, Southern Utah Responds to Denial of Transgender Student Housing, INTERSTATEQ, 
Dec. 18, 2007, http://www.interstateq.com/archives/2479/ (“‘[A letter] has to state 
clearly, by a doctor, are we dealing with a male student or a female student . . . .’” (altera-
tion in original)). 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 While understandable that the University would be concerned with accommodating the 
needs of the majority of the student body, this traditional housing policy, grounded in in-
stitutionalized heterosexism, marginalizes and alienates many students, such as gender 
non-conforming students.  This policy ignores those students who prefer living with 
someone of the opposite sex or gender, as well as those who are uncomfortable being 
housed according to biological sex.  See Comer, supra note 3. 
 10 See generally Brett Beemyn, Serving the Needs of Transgender College Students, 1 J. GAY & 
LESBIAN ISSUES IN EDUC. 33 (2003) (explaining that although transgender youth are be-
coming increasingly visible on college campuses, they remain one of the most under-
served populations). 
 11 See generally Harsh Realities Finds Transgender Youth Face Extreme Harassment in School, GAY, 
LESBIAN AND STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK, Mar. 17, 2009, http://www.glsen.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/all/news/record/2388.html (discussing the high levels of victimization that 
transgender youth face in school). 
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of this epidemic is a critical first step in achieving inclusive, non-
discrimination policies and safer, inclusive campus communities. 
The conflicting interests of transgender and non-transgender stu-
dents present a quandary for university housing.  College students 
have a legitimate and fundamental interest in their living arrange-
ments on college campuses.  Although in the minority, transgender 
students should also have the opportunity to live in a comfortable en-
vironment.  Transgender students may assert their right to campus 
living arrangements according to their self-identified gender, rather 
than their birth sex.  If universities honor these claims, they may face 
legitimate objections from non-transgender students on grounds of 
modesty, safety, and the right to privacy within the home.  Failure to 
honor such claims may also be met by objections from transgender 
students.  The potential constitutional claims that could result from 
accommodating the housing needs of transgender students are laden 
with conflict.  These constitutional issues would arise in the public 
university context and suggest the need for public universities to im-
plement housing policy changes.  Private universities would also 
benefit from such policy recommendations.  Universities should pro-
vide housing options that protect gender expression and identity of 
transgender students and take into account the interests of the rest of 
the student body. 
University life for transgender students should not be marred by 
frustration and alienation within their living space and larger social 
college environment.  This Comment recognizes the difficulties uni-
versities face in balancing the needs of transgender and non-
transgender students and placing transgender students, particularly 
pre-operative students,12 in housing according to self-defined gender 
identity.  Sex segregated housing should remain an option, but not 
the only option.  This Comment suggests that universities make as-
signments on the basis of students’ self-defined gender identity.  As 
 12 “Pre-operative” refers to individuals who desire, but have not yet had, sexual reassignment 
surgery (SRS), while “post-operative” individuals have had SRS.  “Non-operative” is a term 
describing individuals who do not want, or are unable to have, SRS.  Such individuals may 
undergo hormonal and surgical treatments or instead “change their gender presentations 
without bodily alteration.”  Patricia Gagne & Richard Tewksbury, Conformity Pressures and 
Gender Resistance Among Transgendered Individuals, 45 SOC. PROBS. 81, 83 (1998); see also 
NICOLETTE SIRAGUSA, GAY, LESBIAN AND STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK, THE LANGUAGE OF 
GENDER:  A DISCUSSION AND VOCABULARY LIST FOR EDUCATORS ON GENDER IDENTITY 5 
(2001), http://glsen.org/binary-data/GLSEN_ATTACHMENTS/file/179-1.pdf.  But see 
Telephone Interview with Kathryn L. Stewart, Youth Law Project Attorney, Equality Advo-
cates Pennsylvania (Jan. 5, 2009) (explaining that the term post-operative is a “misnomer” 
given the debate within the transgender community as to what surgery is necessary to be 
made into what is classically described as a biologically male or female body). 
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an initial step, universities would change housing forms to include a 
non-binary gender question, which gives students the option to self-
identify outside of the male and female categories.  In addition, uni-
versities would not force transgender students to provide official do-
cumentation of sex reassignment surgery.  This Comment will also 
explore the importance of gender-neutral housing as a means to en-
sure that transgender students benefit from academic and social life.  
In order to accommodate gender non-conforming individuals and 
recognize students’ true gender identity, students who choose this 
option would be assigned housing regardless of gender. 
Part I of the Comment provides an overview of university housing 
policies.  Part II discusses gender theory, social construction of gen-
der, and approaches to challenging the current discourse.  Part III 
explores the right to gender self-determination and challenges the 
notion that the state can and should define your gender identity.  
Part IV examines constitutional claims that transgender and non-
transgender students may assert within the context of university on-
campus housing by exploring various facets of the right to privacy.  
Part V considers students’ First Amendment freedom of association 
claims.  Part VI evaluates current university housing policies and ar-
gues that universities have a legal duty to provide alternative housing 
options to meet the needs of transgender students. 
I. OVERVIEW OF UNIVERSITY CAMPUS HOUSING ISSUES 
University housing is replete with complications and difficult 
choices that impact a fundamental aspect of the college experience.  
Roommate and hallmate assignments, as well as bathroom access, are 
frequent sources of tension and raise contentious and complex issues 
for transgender students.  Most university housing is designated as 
single sex by room, hall, or building and is based on traditional con-
ceptions of sex and gender.13  The implications are significant for all, 
 13 The establishment of co-ed dorms in the 1960s and 1970s provides a historical backdrop 
for considering campus housing today.  See generally ELANA LEVINE, WALLOWING IN SEX:  
THE NEW SEXUAL CULTURE OF 1970S AMERICAN TELEVISION 9 (2007) (explaining that the 
social movements and sexual revolution of the 1960s and 1970s led to the establishment 
of co-ed dorms); 2 RELIGION AND AMERICAN CULTURES:  AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
TRADITIONS, DIVERSITY AND POPULAR EXPRESSIONS 399 (2003) (noting that colleges estab-
lished co-ed dorms in the 1960s and 1970s and stopped prohibiting men and women 
from entering each other’s dormitories).  The liberalization of campus housing suggests 
that the norm of single sex housing was destabilized, but the impact of experimentation 
has been limited because sex segregated housing persists and universities struggle with 
accommodating gender non-conforming individuals.  It should be noted that a student 
might check off a box that indicates self-identified gender that is contrary to biological 
 
Apr. 2010] WINNING THE HOUSING LOTTERY 1219 
 
 
but for transgender students, who represent a near-invisible presence 
on college campuses, the issues are more disturbing because they 
face a dearth of acceptable on-campus housing options.14  Public uni-
versities are in a difficult position.  Most university housing policies 
dictate that room assignments must be based on biological sex and, 
therefore, housing administrators cannot knowingly place a “female” 
student with “male” students, or vice versa.15  While universities may 
want to accommodate transgender students’ requests to be placed in 
a campus housing arrangement according to their self-identified 
gender, universities must also take into account the rights, safety, and 
comfort of non-transgender students.  As a result, universities are 
forced to play a balancing game in which housing administrators jug-
gle the rights of transgender students with those of non-transgender 
students.16
To date, over 220 campuses have taken affirmative steps towards 
adopting policies that protect students from discrimination.17  Such 
non-discrimination policies, which include gender identity and ex-
sex, but this self-identification is likely to be red-flagged unless a student has changed his 
or her transcript and birth certificate.  This is problematic because it conflates the terms 
“sex” and “gender.” 
 14 See BRETT-GENNY JANICZEK BEEMYN, TRANSGENDER LAW & POLICY INST., WAYS THAT U.S. 
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES MEET THE DAY-TO-DAY NEEDS OF TRANSGENDER STUDENTS, 
http://www.transgenderlaw.org/college/guidelines.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (ex-
plaining that the lack of safe and comfortable on-campus housing options is a significant 
problem for transgender students). 
 15 Implicit in this sentence is recognition of the fact that universities play a significant role 
in classifying individuals as male or female.  This classification often comes down to how 
well an individual has transitioned, which is measured, in part, by the sex reassignment 
surgery.  For example, in a study surveying twenty-five colleges, only six had a “process for 
students to change the ‘M/F’ box on their documents without having gender reassign-
ment surgery.”  Brett Genny Beemyn & Jessica Pettitt, How Have Trans-Inclusive Non-
Discrimination Policies Changed Institutions?, GLBT CAMPUS MATTERS:  GUIDANCE FOR 
HIGHER EDUCATION 4 (2006), available at  http://www.jessicapettitt.com/images/Non-
discrimination.pdf.  However, Kathryn Stewart suggests that individuals transition socially 
and medically, and these two aspects of transition do not necessarily have to coincide.  
Often, social transition begins long before medical transition for various reasons, includ-
ing safety and social well-being.  Telephone Interview with Kathryn L. Stewart, supra note 
12. 
 16 See Alex Dubilet, Nondiscrimination Policy All Talk, No Action, Some Say, THE DAILY 
PENNSYLVANIAN, July 15, 2004, available at http://media.www.dailypennsylvanian.com/ 
media/storage/paper882/news/2004/07/15/News/Nondiscrimination.Policy.All.Talk 
.No.Action.Some.Say-2151306.shtml (describing the involvement of LGBT activists in 
amending nondiscrimination policies). 
 17 2008 GENIUS INDEX:  GENDER EQUALITY NATIONAL INDEX FOR UNIVERSITIES AND 
SCHOOLS 2 (2008) (on file with author).  The GENIUS Index is a tool designed to track 
academic institutions leading efforts to create “GenderSAFE” campuses that “create safe, 
supportive, and equitable environments where students can learn, grow, and succeed 
whether or not they fit the expectations or stereotypes for masculinity or femininity.”  Id. 
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pression, are invaluable because their reach is not only limited to 
transgender individuals, but also extends to individuals who do not 
adhere to gender stereotypes.18  Nevertheless, in 2008, 45% of stu-
dent respondents to the 2008 GENIUS Survey reported being har-
assed or witnessing harassment due to expectations of masculinity 
and femininity.19  The problem of harassment in residence halls due 
to gender is significant, with 25% of students reporting that they had 
been harassed or witnessed harassment in a residence hall due to 
gender.20  Universities and colleges have faced minimal litigation with 
regard to transgender students and university housing, yet student 
transgender advocacy and social activist groups are rallying behind 
this cause by raising awareness about transgender issues on college 
campuses and creating a supportive community.21
II. GENDER THEORY 
In order to examine the issues faced by the transgendered com-
munity in the university housing context, it is important to explore 
various concepts within gender theory to understand the complexity 
of gender identity and expression.  The remainder of this Part dem-
onstrates that sex and gender are socially constructed and develop 
through interaction with others. 
A. Denaturalizing Sex and Gender 
The following definitions provide a foundation to better under-
stand essential terms in this arena.  These definitions will be critiqued 
and challenged in the remainder of this section. 
Gender:  a “way of perceiving bodies, behavior, and dress as either mas-
culine or feminine.”22
Sex:  “[a]ssigned biological sex, as evidenced by chromosomes or geni-
tals.”23
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id.  See generally Brett Genny Beemyn, Trans on Campus:  Measuring and Improving the Cli-
mate for Transgender Students, ON CAMPUS WITH WOMEN, Spring 2005, 
http://www.aacu.org/ocww/volume34_3/feature.cfm?section=2 (providing statistics on 
the harassment of transgendered students and the effects on their attitudes and behav-
iors). 
 21 See generally Groups Aid Transgender Student Who Was Denied Housing, THE ADVOCATE, Dec. 
19, 2007, http://www.advocate.com/news_detail_ektid51190.asp (describing the groups 
that came to Kourt Osborn’s aid at Southern Utah University). 
 22 GENIUS INDEX, supra note 17, at 3. 
 23 Id. 
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Transgender:  an umbrella term “used to describe people who do not 
identify with the gender roles assigned to them by society based on their 
biological sex.”24
Gender Expression:  “[m]anifesting feelings of masculinity or femininity 
through how one looks, acts, and dresses;”25 distinguished from sexual 
orientation. 
Gender Identity:  an “individual’s innermost sense of self as 
‘male/masculine’ ‘female/feminine,’ somewhere in between, or some-
where outside of these gender boundaries.  Sometimes this ‘innermost 
sense’ does not correspond with anatomy (e.g. a person born anatomi-
cally male, but who identifies as female).”26
Gender Non-Conforming:  describing “someone who displays non-
traditional forms of gender expression.”27
Gender Dysphoria:  “[u]nhappiness or discomfort with the gender role 
assigned by family and society to one’s biological sex.”28
Female to Male (FTM):  a “person born biologically female, who identi-
fies [as] or feels male, and who takes on the sex, gender, or both of a 
male through surgery, mannerisms, dress, behavior, etc.”29
Male to Female (MTF):  a “person born biologically male, who identifies 
as or feels female, and who takes on the sex, gender, or both of a female 
through surgery, mannerisms, dress, behavior, etc.”30
Sexual Reassignment Surgery:  a “surgical procedure that modifies one’s 
primary and/or secondary sex characteristics through surgery.”31
The terms “sex” and “gender” are laden with nuances and ambigui-
ties that a one-sentence definition cannot adequately convey.  The 
abundance of literature exposes the complexity of these concepts and 
questions the nature of sex as biological and determinative of gen-
der.32  The assumption that sex is biologically determined through 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Siragusa, supra note 12, at 1. 
 27 GENIUS INDEX, supra note 17, at 3. 
 28 Siragusa, supra note 12, at 3. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 4. 
 32 See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:  FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF 
IDENTITY (1990) (challenging sex as a natural biological fact as well as the gender identity 
given based on biological sex); Elaine Craig, Trans-phobia and the Relational Production of 
Gender, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 137 (2007) (depicting how and why transgender issues 
are often experienced as uncomfortable or disruptive); Andrew Gilden, Toward a More 
Transformative Approach:  The Limits of Transgender Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER 
L. & JUST. 83 (2008) (addressing the means by which rights-based approaches to trans-
gender advocacy risk undermining its transformative possibilities); Dean Spade, Resisting 
Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 16–18 (2003) (showing the 
importance of relying on medical evidence with respect to transgender issues); Dylan 
Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law:  Toward a Social and Legal Conceptualization 
of Gender that is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 256–58 
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anatomy, hormones, and physiology, contributes to the premise that 
sex flows from nature.  Although many individuals are not fully male 
or female,33 society generally accepts a male-female binary.34  Academ-
ics have challenged this concept of biological essentialism35 because it 
defines sex identity through genitalia and takes “sex” outside of the 
“realm of social construction.”36
Biological essentialism also impacts the way in which we under-
stand gender.37  Feminist and gender theory scholars question the 
conceptualization of gender as biologically determined by sex.  
Feminist scholar Judith Butler argues that both sex and gender are 
cultural constructions.38  Dylan Vade offers a comprehensive defini-
tion of gender that asserts its dynamic nature: 
Gender is one’s own specific way of interacting with and presenting one-
self to the world.  Gender is expression . . . . Gender is how we relate to 
each other and to the world. . . . Gender is a sense of self and a relation-
ship to the world.  One’s sense of self is organic and inter-relational.  
Gender is that expressive, relational, embodied self.39
(2005) (describing how transgender people are discriminated against in many areas of 
life). 
 33 Intersexed persons, who are one out of every 2000 children, have both male and female 
characteristics at birth.  Jamison Green, Introduction to PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON 
MINTER, NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY:  A HANDBOOK FOR 
ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 1, 5 (2000), http://thetaskforce.org/downloads 
/reports/reports/TransgenderEquality.pdf; see also Jennifer Rellis, “Please Write ‘E’ in This 
Box” Toward Self-Identification and Recognition of a Third Gender:  Approaches in the United 
States and India, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 223, 223–24 (2008) (describing the prevalence 
of “intersexed individuals”). 
 34 Rellis, supra note 33, at 224 (explaining the traditional premise that sex is “fixed at 
birth . . . [and] that everyone fits neatly into boxes labeled male and female”). 
 35 See, e.g., Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes:  Why Male and Female Are Not Enough, THE 
SCIENCES, Mar.–Apr. 1993, at 20, 20–21 (exploring the need to expand the two accepted 
categories of male and female, for there are “many gradations running from female to 
male”). 
 36 Gilden, supra note 32, at 88–89 (explaining that individuals become “legible as male or 
female as a result of the cultural inscription of sex at birth,” resulting in the “illusion” that 
“sex is innate and not the product of interpellation”); see also JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES 
THAT MATTER:  ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF “SEX” 7–8 (1993) (describing the “medical 
interpellation which . . . shifts an infant from an ‘it’ to a ‘she’ or a ‘he’”).  
 37 See Gilden, supra note 32, at 89 (“If gender is understood as a social construction of sex, 
and is thus alterable only within the limits of one’s assigned sex, gender thus limits its 
own reconstruction so long as sex remains understood as an uncontestable category.”); 
Franklin H. Romeo, Beyond a Medical Model:  Advocating for a New Conception of Gender Iden-
tity in the Law, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713, 719 (2005) (describing a model of gen-
der under which the “social and cultural attributes associated with gender are the natural 
result of a person’s biological sex”). 
 38 BUTLER, supra note 32, at 11; see also Gilden, supra note 32, at 88 (gender is not simply a 
“cultural manifestation of one’s biological sex.  Rather, it is a normative ideology that 
creates the appearance of a determinative biological self”). 
 39 Vade, supra note 32, at 276 (citation omitted). 
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Implicit in Vade’s definition is a recognition that gender is “situ-
ational” and changes over the course of time.40  This definition resists 
generalizing gender and instead acknowledges that gender must be 
personalized.  This notion of “gender fluidity” rejects biological de-
terminism.41  Scholars have noted that various societies embrace a 
dynamic gendered existence in which gender is not “indelibly deter-
mined by one’s biological sex, but rather by other aesthetic, occupa-
tional, religious, or sexual factors that interweave with the human 
body.”42
Gender identity does not develop in a bubble, but is the product 
of interaction with others and is colored by societal reception of gen-
der expression.43  This relational aspect of gender identity and ex-
pression often results in the performance of gender.  West and Zim-
merman explain that “doing gender” involves individuals in “a 
complex of socially guided perceptual, interactional, and micropoliti-
cal activities” that are perceived to be reflections of masculine and 
feminine natures.44  Managing gender seems to be individual, but, in 
reality, societal interaction and institutions are the guides of norma-
tive behavior and create a pressure to conform,45 contributing to a 
culture of inequality and exclusivity. 
B. Gender Theory and Transgender Individuals 
In “doing” gender, individuals can refuse to live up to normative 
ideals of gendered behavior and “engage in behavior at the risk of 
gender assessment.”46  Individuals who reject normative gender cate-
gories rattle society’s fundamental understanding of gender and chal-
 40 Id. at 267 (“[R]ecognition of one’s gender identity at one point in time does not negate a 
different identification at a different point in time.”). 
 41 See generally Gilden, supra note 32, at 86 (arguing that gender fluidity “does not look to 
biology or anatomy as necessary determinants of gender roles . . . [and] provide[s] space 
for fluidity between and within gender roles”). 
 42 Id. at 119 (citations omitted).  See generally Rellis, supra note 33, at 224–27 (describing the 
prevalence of gender fluidity). 
 43 See Craig, supra note 32, at 141 (arguing that gender is created in a “relational, interpre-
tive manner” and that gender identity is the result of biological and psychological proc-
esses as well as social and cultural interactions); see also Riki Wilchins, A Continuous Non-
verbal Communication, in GENDER QUEER:  VOICES FROM BEYOND THE SEXUAL BINARY 11, 12 
(Joan Nestle et al. eds., 2002) (explaining that gender is created in a “continuous non-
verbal dialogue with the world”). 
 44 Candace West & Don H. Zimmerman, Doing Gender, in DOING GENDER, DOING 
DIFFERENCE:  INEQUALITY, POWER, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 3, 4 (Sarah Fenstermaker 
& Candace West eds., 2002). 
 45 Id. at 13. 
 46 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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lenge the “binary biological truth about human experience.”47  The 
difficulty in accepting gender identity as separate from biological sex 
is reflected in societal unfamiliarity and discomfort with transgender 
identity. 
Accepting transgender identity often provokes anxiety because 
there is “no one way to be transgender. . . . there is no prototypical trans-
gender experience.”48  The term “transgender” is not monolithic, but in-
stead must be read broadly in order to recognize the complexity of 
gender identity and the diversity of the transgender experience.49  
Vade suggests that transgender people “have all genders,” arguing 
there are “infinitely different women and infinitely different men.”50  
For example, individuals may identify as combinations of male and 
female, may not identify as either male or female, or may see them-
selves as falling between male and female.51  As a result, transgender 
individuals have “different identities, bodies, levels of fluidity, sexual 
orientations, and ways of mixing and matching all of the above.”52  
This “mixing and matching” can be threatening to individuals who 
 47 Gilden, supra note 32, at 91 (explaining that “[b]y performing deeds that fail to conform 
to those activities that supposedly flow naturally from one’s birth-assigned sex, trans peo-
ple reveal sex is the cultural inscription of meaning on human bodies”). 
 48 Vade, supra note 32, at 271. 
 49 See id. at 261 (proposing a non-linear conceptualization of gender, a “gender galaxy,” de-
fined as “three-dimensional non-linear space in which every gender has a location that 
may or may not be fixed”). 
 50 Id. at 264–65. 
 51 Id. at 265; see also KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW:  ON MEN, WOMEN, AND THE REST OF 
US 144–45 (1994) (self-describing as a “gender outlaw” who identifies as neither male nor 
female); LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANS LIBERATION:  BEYOND PINK OR BLUE 1 (1998) (describ-
ing personal narrative as an FTM who does not identify as either male or female and in-
stead uses the gender-neutral pronoun “sie”). 
 52 Vade, supra note 32, at 271 (describing the concept of “body diversity,” under which trans 
individuals make a wide range of choices for their bodies with regards to hormone treat-
ment and surgery).  It is important to note that transgender individuals have different 
sexual orientations and may identify as straight, gay, lesbian, bisexual, or any other sexual 
orientation.  Transgender causes are often distinct from LGB causes.  “Gender identity 
and sexual orientation are not the same.” GLAAD, MEDIA REFERENCE GUIDE 8 (8th ed. 
2010), available at http://www.glaad.org/Document.Doc?id=99.  See generally BISEXUALITY 
AND TRANSGENDERISM:  INTERSEXIONS OF THE OTHERS (Jonathan Alexander & Karen Yes-
cavage eds., 2003) (providing an overview of literature arguing that transgender identity 
issues are distinct from sexual orientation issues); Raine Dozier, Beards, Breasts, and Bodies:  
Doing Sex in a Gendered World, 19 GENDER & SOC’Y 297 (2005) (exploring the distinction 
between gender identity and sexual orientation); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, 
and Tomboys:  Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Eu-
ro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 25 (1995) (discussing the historical and 
contemporary confusion and distortion of sex, gender, and sexual orientation as social 
and legal constructs).   
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cling to gender identity—their own and others’—because gender is a 
critical component of “self-concept” and social identity.53
Recognition of the complexity of transgender identity is impeded 
by the medicalization of gender identity, which reinforces the gender 
binary.54  The reliance on medical evidence forces individuals who 
want to express an identity separate from their biologically desig-
nated sex to show their desire for gender normativity, convince doc-
tors that they have Gender Identity Disorder,55 and indicate that they 
want body alteration to match a narrow gender identity.56  This has 
significant implications in the university housing context.  In addition 
to relying on the identity indicated on the birth certificate, housing 
policies often require that physicians supervise hormone treatment, 
that therapists diagnose the student with gender dysphoria, and that 
the student undergo sexual reassignment surgery. 
The medicalization of gender identity ignores the fact that trans-
gender individuals make choices about their bodies for different per-
sonal and economic reasons.57  This medicalization has permeated 
American jurisprudence, which reflects the tendency to pathologize 
transgenderism and ignore the complexities of transgender identity.58  
 53 Carolyn Jackson & Jo Warin, The Importance of Gender as an Aspect of Identity at Key Transi-
tion Points in Compulsory Education, 26 BRIT. EDUC. RES. J. 375, 375–76 (2000).  See Part 
IV.B for a more detailed discussion of prejudice against transgender individuals. 
 54 See generally JOANNE MEYEROWITZ, HOW SEX CHANGED:  A HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUALITY IN 
THE UNITED STATES (2002) (providing a historical perspective on transsexuality and de-
scribing the shift in medical beliefs regarding sex); Dean Spade, supra note 32, at 18 
(“[M]edical care associated with sex reassignment is still doled out through gender-
regulating processes that reinforce oppressive and sexist gender binaries.”). 
 55 See Romeo, supra note 37, at 725 (describing the medical criteria for Gender Identity Dis-
order as an “on-going desire since early childhood to be the ‘opposite’ gender, a desire to 
physically modify one’s body, and heterosexual desire in the gender with which one iden-
tifies”); see also AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 532–37 (4th ed. 1994). 
 56 Spade, supra note 32, at 24 (“My quest for body alteration had to be legitimized by a 
medical reference to . . . a binary gender system . . . .”); see also Romeo, supra note 37, at 
724–27 (examining the “medical model” of gender under which gender nonconformity is 
a psychological condition and individuals must “meet certain norms of their lived gen-
der”). 
 57 Romeo, supra note 37, at 730 (arguing that the “medical model of gender privileges those 
who have the ability to access health care and choose to undergo all available medical 
procedures to modify their bodies, while providing very limited protection, if any, to 
those who do not”). 
 58 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994) (defining transgender as “one who has 
‘[a] rare psychiatric disorder in which a person feels persistently uncomfortable about his 
or her anatomical sex,’ and who typically seeks medical treatment, including hormonal 
therapy and surgery, to bring about a permanent sex change” (quoting AMERICAN 
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 1006 (1989))); Maggert v. Hanks, 131 
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Scholars criticize current legal strategies of protection for trans-
gender people because they force transgender people into the binary 
and fail to challenge underlying norms.59  Scholars suggest that indi-
vidual victories obtained under current legal strategies may be coun-
terproductive to long-term progress, and instead advocate new strate-
gies to alter dominant discourse.60  The different approaches to 
transgender advocacy provide an important framework for evaluating 
the realities transgender individuals face in dealing with university 
housing policies and suggest strategies for challenging mainstream 
gender norms. 
III. GENDER SELF-DETERMINATION 
The troubling nature of the state’s authority to identify individuals 
as male or female presents rigid obstacles in creating a space for fluid 
gender identities.  Feminist and gender theory literature suggest that 
individuals should have the right to self-identify outside of the gender 
binary.61  The ability to choose a gender identity may be distinguished 
from the right to define an identity.  Do individuals have the constitu-
tional right to identify gender for themselves as they choose? 
F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Someone eager to undergo this mutilation is plainly suf-
fering from a profound psychiatric disorder.”). 
 59 See Gilden, supra note 32, at 104 (“To the extent that this border constitutes one between 
sanity and pathology, the distinction reaffirms the abjection of the transgendered status 
and normalizes mainstream understanding of maleness and femaleness.”); see also Fran-
cine Tilewick Bazluke & Jeffrey J. Nolan, “Because of Sex”:  The Evolving Legal Riddle of Sex-
ual vs. Gender Identity, 32 J.C. & U.L. 361, 366 (2006) (explaining that the courts have 
overwhelmingly failed to recognize the distinction in meaning between sex and gender); 
Vade, supra note 32, at 255 (explaining that the system generally works against trans-
gender people, who have historically been successful when they fit a narrow view of what 
it means to be transgender). 
 60 Transgender legal advocacy is plagued by the controversial challenge of balancing the 
value of disability-based arguments that reinforce the gender binary against the impor-
tance of securing legal recourse for transgender individuals.  See Gilden, supra note 32, at 
92 (criticizing sex-stereotyping theory because it does not challenge biological essential-
ism and instead advocating a rights-based approach under which transgender advocacy 
“must directly confront the underlying social meaning attached to such expression”); 
Spade, supra note 32, at 29 (arguing that the “goal for trans law and policy remains 
demedicalization and an end to practices that coerce people into expressing gender 
identity through a narrowly defined binary”). 
 61 See generally Laura K. Langley, Note, Self-Determination in a Gender Fundamentalist State:  To-
ward Legal Liberation of Transgender Identities, 12 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 101 (2006) (positing a 
“right to gender self-determination” under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause); Rellis, supra note 33, at 256–57 (arguing that advocates should “begin building a 
constitutional right to self-identify outside the gender binary” based on the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
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If one accepts the premise that sex and gender are social con-
structs, individuals become victims of the label assigned to them at 
birth.62  Critical race theorists suggest that race is socially constructed 
and, therefore, is not indicated on birth certificates because it is cen-
tral to an individual’s self identity.63  Following this logic, scholars ar-
gue that gender is a “healthy and legitimate expression of a person’s 
identity, whether or not expression conforms with the expected 
norms of their birth gender . . . .”64  Consequently, the legal system 
should recognize resistance of normative manifestations of gender as 
an expression of an essential part of identity, not as an act of defi-
ance. 
Scholars have suggested that the right to gender self-
determination has its roots in the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which protects personal dignity and autonomy.65  
Gender self-determination stems from the right to privacy.66  Al-
though there is no explicit right to privacy in the Constitution, in 
Griswold v. Connecticut,67 the Supreme Court recognized that the “pe-
numbra of rights” provides a guarantee of zones of privacy.  The fun-
damental rights that emanate from the penumbras of the Constitu-
tion have been expanded upon through the recognition of more 
extensive liberty rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.68  In 
 62 Vade, supra note 32, at 285 (critiquing the sex-gender distinction because it gives doctors 
power to assign gender by using “doctor-assigned gender” to define “sex”). 
 63 See Craig, supra note 32, at 168  (“[I]t is ‘not ethical for anyone to exert power to define a 
feature of [another’s] core identity.’”  (quoting Elizabeth Reilly, Radical Tweak—Relocating 
the Power to Assign Sex:  From Enforcer of Differentiation to Facilitator of Inclusiveness:  Revising 
the Response to Intersexuality, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 297, 324 (2005))).  Interestingly, 
in 2000, the Census was amended to allow respondents to select one or more races for 
the first time.  However, the Census allows respondents to check only one gender box.  
Racial and Ethnic Classifications Used in Census 2000 and Beyond, U.S. Census Bureau, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race/racefactcb.html (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2010); see also Ramona E. Douglass, Dir. of Media & Public Relations, Ass’n of 
MultiEthnic Ams., Upgrading America’s Conversations on Race:  The Multi-Race Option 
for Census 2000 (June 2000), http://www.ameasite.org/census/upgrade2k.asp (“What 
has been dismantled . . . is the mythical notion that race is fixed rather than fluid, or that 
any governmental agency’s perception of racial identity takes priority over an individual’s 
right to self-identify.”). 
 64 Romeo, supra note 37, at 739. 
 65 See Langley, supra note 61, at 101 (“To fully realize the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise 
of liberty, people must be able to determine gender for themselves.”). 
 66 See id. at 115–16. 
 67 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965) (recognizing the marriage relationship as falling within the 
constitutionally protected “zone of privacy”). 
 68 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) 
(“Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty 
which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.”). 
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Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Supreme 
Court stated that “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s 
own concept of existence.”69  The Court in Lawrence v. Texas empha-
sized the “substantive force of the liberty protected by the Due Proc-
ess Clause” under Casey, which was based on “the respect the Consti-
tution demands for the autonomy of the person” when making 
decisions in the realm of procreation and family relationships.70  In 
extending the recognition of such autonomy to the realm of sexuality 
and sexual conduct,71 the Court relied on a robust reading of liberty 
rather than reaching to “specific tradition”72 or fundamental rights 
that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”73
The Court’s recognition of the more encompassing and evolving 
liberty rights acknowledged in Lawrence could be extended to gender 
self-determination.74  Decisions such as Casey and Lawrence criticize 
excessive state regulation in areas involving “choices central to per-
sonal dignity and autonomy.”75  An individual’s chosen gender iden-
tity is at the core of such liberty and autonomy rights.76  Gender iden-
tity is a fundamental aspect of one’s self-concept and, therefore, an 
integral part of existence.  It should not be “formed under compul-
sion of the State.”77
The law is not a reflection of gender realities for transgender indi-
viduals.78  Allowing for the possibility of gender self-determination 
strikes at the foundation of the male-female binary and permits “the 
addition of infinite new classifications of individuals’ genders.”79  This 
theoretical argument is a step in ensuring that individuals are not the 
victims of gender “labels” or the state’s “coercive power to create the 
gender-related legal categories.”80  However appealing this concept of 
 69 Id. at 851. 
 70 539 U.S. 558, 573–74 (2003). 
 71 See id. at 574. 
 72 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989). 
 73 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). 
 74 See Langley, supra note 61, at 117 (“Justice Kennedy’s reasoning in Lawrence may be im-
ported to the gender self-determination context.”). 
 75 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 76 See Rellis, supra note 33, at 258 (“What is closer to the ‘heart of liberty’ and more ‘central 
to personal dignity and autonomy’ than an individual’s chosen gender identity—to be 
granted full legal rights and protection against discrimination even if one does not fall in-
to one of two neat societal boxes labeled male or female.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 77 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
 78 See Vade, supra note 32, at 255 (“The law paints a specific picture of transgender peo-
ple . . . in which all transgender people look the same.”). 
 79 Langley, supra note 61, at 102. 
 80 Id. at 113. 
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gender self-identification may be, state compelling interests81 create 
substantial obstacles for translating theory into practice, especially in 
university housing. 
If we can embrace a framework in which we reconceptualize gen-
der as a social construct, the concept of self-identification becomes 
more plausible.  However, when self-identification is considered in 
university housing, the individualized nature of self-identification 
claims becomes increasingly complicated because university housing 
is not a solitary experience.  The practical considerations of room-
mates, hallmates, and privacy concerns in an area that already in-
volves discretionary and subjective decisions create a housing quan-
dary.  The claims that transgender and non-transgender students may 
assert to contest their housing situation will be explored through dif-
ferent aspects of the right to privacy and the First Amendment free-
dom of association. 
IV. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
Our jurisprudence has consistently affirmed the sanctity of the 
home.  Significant concerns arise when students are not comfortable 
in their dorm rooms.  Both transgender and non-transgender stu-
dents may raise various claims founded in the right to privacy. 
In identifying the right to privacy, future Justices Louis D. Bran-
deis and Samuel D. Warren emphasized the home as a safe place for 
expressing one’s identity and “inviolate personality.”82  The Supreme 
Court’s recognition of the right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut83 
and subsequent cases have affirmed the “right to be let alone” in the 
home.84  These cases suggest the importance of the right to engage in 
activities within the home that would be off limits elsewhere. 
 81 See id. at 128 (describing the state’s interests in identifying individuals, maintaining re-
cords, and remedying discrimination claims). 
 82 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 
(1890) (presenting the intellectual beginnings of the American right to privacy and the 
“right to be let alone”); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (characterizing the “right to be let alone” as “the right most val-
ued by civilized men”). 
 83 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 84 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (arguing that the individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the home and, therefore, the use of thermal imaging 
to search a home constitutes an unreasonable search); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 
(1980) (describing the importance of “[p]reserving the sanctity of the home, the one re-
treat to which men and women . . . escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits”); 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a 
firm line at the entrance to the house.”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) 
(concluding that the possession of illegal obscene materials in the home was not punish-
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The notion of privacy extends beyond personal space of the home 
to include the “concept of personal liberty.”85  Privacy is widely rec-
ognized as an umbrella concept that encompasses physical, informa-
tional, decisional, proprietary, and associational privacy.86  This 
Comment explores different aspects of the right to privacy regarding 
transgender students, with a particular focus on physical and infor-
mational privacy. 
A. Modesty Concerns 
Shared living arrangements, a form of intimate association, are 
protected by the right to privacy.87  Intricately tied to the notion of 
physical privacy in one’s living arrangement is the physical privacy in-
terest in one’s body.88  In recognizing modesty claims, many courts 
have acknowledged the individual’s interest in keeping one’s body 
secluded from the opposite sex.89  In Johnson v. Phelan,90 Judge Pos-
ner, in his dissent, described the issue as whether the appellant pris-
oner has an “interest that the Constitution protects in hiding his na-
ked body from guards of the opposite sex.”91  Posner emphasized the 
importance of “Christian modesty” and the strength of the American 
“nudity taboo,” especially when applied to strangers of the opposite 
able based on the right to satisfy intellectual and emotional needs in the home); Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (finding that searching the home is an invasion of privacy 
and in violation of the Fourth Amendment if found to be unreasonable). 
 85 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (explaining that the “right of privacy” is 
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s “concept of personal liberty”); see also Kastl v. 
Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. Civ.02-1531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954, at *5 (D. 
Ariz. June 3, 2004) (“The right to privacy is derivative of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of substantive due process, among other constitutional provisions, although it 
is not expressly guaranteed by the Constitution.”  (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 
598–99 nn.23–25 (1977))). 
 86 See ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIETY 1 (2007); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 
599–600 (recognizing informational and decisional privacy interests within the zone of 
privacy). 
 87 See generally John T. Messerly, Roommate Wanted:  The Right to Choice in Shared Living, 93 
IOWA L. REV. 1949 (2008) (describing the privacy interests present in shared living ar-
rangements). 
 88 York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963) (“We cannot conceive of a more basic sub-
ject of privacy than the naked body.”). 
 89 See generally Anita Allen, Disrobed:  The Constitution of Modesty, 51 VILL. L. REV. 841, 843–45 
(2006) (describing modesty as a “moral or ethical virtue” and suggesting the gendered 
nature of sexual modesty requirements). 
 90 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that prison officials did not violate male prisoners’ 
rights by having female guards monitor them when naked). 
 91 Id. at 152 (Posner, J., dissenting in part). 
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sex.92  Various cases have similar language discussing the modesty and 
privacy interests against exposing one’s body in the presence of the 
opposite sex.93
Same “sexness” protects and bolsters the individual’s privacy 
claims.  By assigning both female non-transgender students to live 
with individuals who identify as females, but were classified as male by 
birth, and male non-transgender students to live with students who 
were female by birth, but self-identify as male, non-transgender stu-
dents may argue that they are uncomfortable with a living arrange-
ment that violates their privacy interest in keeping their bodies se-
cluded from the opposite sex.94  In considering privacy and modesty-
related claims in university housing, there is no case law specifically 
on point,95 and, therefore, cases involving transgender individuals in 
 92 Id. (“The nudity taboo retains great strength in the United States. . . . The taboo is par-
ticularly strong when the stranger belongs to the opposite sex.”). 
 93 See Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 1993) (joining courts in “recogniz-
ing a prisoner’s constitutional right to bodily privacy because most people have a special 
sense of privacy in their genitals, and involuntary exposure of them in the presence of 
people of the other sex may be especially demeaning and humiliating”) (internal cita-
tions omitted); York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963) (explaining that the pho-
tographing of a female’s nude body by a male officer and the distribution of the photo-
graphs were an invasion of privacy because “[t]he desire to shield one’s unclothed figure 
from view of strangers, and particularly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by ele-
mentary self-respect and personal dignity”); Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. 
Supp. 1410, 1421 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (acknowledging the fundamental nature of concerns 
about exposing one’s body in front of a member of the opposite sex); Brooks v. ACF In-
dus., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1122, 1132 (S.D. W. Va. 1982) (recognizing that a person’s legiti-
mate privacy rights in using a washroom would be violated if a cleaning attendant of the 
opposite sex were to enter). 
 94 These claims, which rely on a biological essentialism, would most likely be asserted in cas-
es of pre- and non-operative transgender individuals. 
 95 In 1996, several Orthodox Jewish students sought to be exempted from Yale’s on-campus 
housing requirement on the grounds that their “religious beliefs and obligations regard-
ing sexual modesty forbid them to reside in the co-educational housing provided and 
mandated by Yale.”  Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 16 F. Supp.2d 183, 186–87 
(D. Conn. 1998), aff’d, 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000).  The District Court of Connecticut 
dismissed the students’ claims that Yale’s policies violated their constitutional rights to 
free exercise of religion, as well as federal housing and anti-trust statutes.  Id.  The mod-
esty and privacy arguments by the “Yale Five” were not discussed in the District and Cir-
cuit court decisions.  Yale administrators acknowledged grappling with the challenge of 
balancing the needs of minority groups with the general student body, but they ultimately 
took the position that they could not excuse the “Yale Five” from the housing policy, 
which is a “‘defining requirement’ of a Yale education.”  William Glaberson, Five Orthodox 
Jews Spur Moral Debate Over Housing Rules at Yale, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1997, at 45, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/07/nyregion/five-orthodox-jews-spur-moral-debate 
-over-housing-rules-at-yale.html?scp=1&sq=Five%20Orthodox%20Jews%20Spur%20Moral 
%20Debate%20Over%20Housing%20Rules%20at%20Yale&st=cse.  The Yale controversy 
is distinguishable from the university housing dilemma because transgender students are 
generally not asking to be exempted from housing requirements; in fact, they are asking 
 
1232 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:4 
 
 
prison housing and bathroom access litigation provide an interesting 
point of comparison. 
1. Privacy in the Prison Context 
While the housing issues that transgender prisoners face are dis-
tinguishable from those of transgender university students,96 both in-
volve sex segregated housing and bathroom access which are based 
on biological sex.97  At the outset, a university’s placement of an indi-
vidual in male or female housing requires prior classification.  Before 
other college students are introduced into the mix, housing authori-
ties must choose the “appropriate” housing pool based on the univer-
sity’s accepted definition of sex.  In his analysis of the issues facing 
transgender prisoners, Darren Rosenblum noted that in pre-
incarceration processing, authorities try to determine if a prisoner is 
a man or woman.98  Observing that prisoners are placed on the basis 
of genitalia,99  Rosenblum found only one case where a pre-operative 
for housing options that do not ignore their gender identity.  Furthermore, as discussed 
below, the physical privacy arguments would most likely be mounted by non-transgender 
students, the majority, as opposed to the religious minority group in the Yale situation. 
 96 Some distinctions include the difference in the student body versus prison population, 
the heightened safety concerns in prison, and Eighth Amendment analysis.  Darren Ro-
senblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing:  Transgendered Prisoners Caught in the Gender Binarism, 6 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 519–20 (2000).  One important distinction is that students 
choose to attend university, whereas prisoners have no choice about their imprisonment.  
Furthermore, courts have generally recognized that prisoners have reduced privacy ex-
pectations.  See e.g., Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Prison inmates 
do not shed all fundamental protections of the Constitution at the prison gates.” (quot-
ing Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994)); Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 
F.2d 912, 916 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[A] convicted prisoner maintains some reasonable expec-
tations of privacy while in prison, particularly where those claims are related to forced 
exposure to strangers of the opposite sex, even though those privacy rights may be less 
than those enjoyed by non-prisoners.”); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 418 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (recognizing that a transgender prisoner’s expectation of privacy was signifi-
cantly limited in light of the overriding need to maintain institutional order and secu-
rity). 
 97 See Christine Peek, Breaking Out of the Prison Hierarchy:  Transgender Prisoners, Rape, and the 
Eighth Amendment, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV 1211, 1212 (2004) (describing the “common 
practice of classifying transgender prisoners based on their genitalia alone”); Rosenblum, 
supra note 96, at 523 (noting that placement based on genitalia is a “crude simplification 
of [the trans] gender identity”). 
 98 See Rosenblum, supra note 96, at 520 (describing the intake process for new inmates). 
 99 Id. at 522 (“The practice of federal prison authorities is to incarcerate preoperative trans-
sexuals with prisoners of like biological sex.” (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 
(1994)); Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 320 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The practice of the federal 
prison authorities . . . is to incarcerate persons who have completed sexual reassignment 
with prisoners of the transsexual’s new gender, but to incarcerate persons who have not 
completed it with prisoners of the transsexual’s original gender.”). 
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transgendered woman was placed in a women’s facility.  In Crosby v. 
Reynolds, a female prisoner brought an action against jail officials for 
violating her privacy rights when she was housed with Lamson, a pre-
operative transgender prisoner, who was housed according to her 
self-defined gender identity.100  The female prisoner felt uncomfort-
able sharing a cell with a pre-operative individual, especially when us-
ing the bathroom, showering, and other activities involving nudity.101  
The situation presented an infrequent quandary to which there was 
no established procedure and “no perfect answer.”102  Lamson did not 
want to be segregated, and her safety would have been compromised 
with male prisoners.103
While the court recognized the objections of the female cellmate 
as legitimate, the court ultimately concluded that “reasonable offi-
cials . . . would not understand that what they were doing violated the 
constitutional rights of the plaintiff.”104  The court recognized a clear 
constitutional right to privacy, but stated that the “contours of that 
right are not clear when it comes to the determination of where to 
house transsexuals.”105  The court noted ambiguity in the resolution, 
as well as objections to housing transgendered inmates according to 
their self-defined gender identity, stemming from discomfort and 
safety concerns.106
The historic “sex-dichotomized prison system” compounds the dif-
ficulty of addressing transgender prisoners’ needs.107  Rosenblum 
suggests that the ideal solution would be placement based on self-
defined gender identity, but he notes that the “principal problem 
with this solution is the comfort and security of the traditionally-
gendered prisoners.”108  He continues: 
Potential intolerance toward a transgendered person, however, should 
not be the sole factor in determining the best placement . . . . However, 
100 763 F. Supp. 666, 666–67 (D. Me. 1991).  The jail’s physician opined it was in Lamson’s 
best psychological and physical interest to be placed in female housing.  Id. at 667.  The 
court emphasized that while Lamson’s “male genitalia remain anatomically intact,” Lam-
son had received hormone treatments, developed tissue resembling female breasts, was 
scheduled for a “sex change operation,” and had virtually no male sexual capacity.  Id. at 
667, 669. 
101 Id. at 667–68. 
102 Id. at 669. 
103 Of the transgendered prison population, it is principally transgendered women (MTF) 
placed in male prisons who face rape, abuse, severe violence, and ostracism.  Rosenblum, 
supra note 96, at 517 n.84. 
104 Crosby, 763 F. Supp. at 670. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 669–70. 
107 Rosenblum, supra note 96, at 531. 
108 Id. 
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even if objections to housing transgendered women in a women’s prison 
stem from homophobia, such objections require consideration.  Legiti-
mate objections to housing transgendered inmates according to their 
self-defined gender identity do exist.109
The suggestion that segregation on the basis of biological sex may be 
justified by “legitimate penological objectives”110 is likely to be recog-
nized in the university housing context, even if motivated by tran-
sphobia.  While safety concerns are presumably greater and privacy 
presents less of a hurdle in the prison context, universities may posit 
legitimate educational and safety objectives in support of maintaining 
the housing status quo.  Sex segregated university housing policies 
are traditional practice and represent precautionary measures that 
are justified by the state’s legitimate interest in the safety of the gen-
eral student body. 
2. Privacy in Bathroom Access Cases 
Cases in which transgender individuals assert the right to use 
bathrooms111 according to self-defined gender identity also stress the 
conflict between non-conforming gender identity and societal norms.  
Described as “one of the last sex segregated public spaces,” the public 
restroom forces individuals to confront gender stereotypes in the de-
cision of which bathroom to use and to “assess the potential risk of 
entering that space.”112
Non-transgender individuals assert privacy interests in bathroom-
access cases.  While privacy may be a valid concern, such claims are 
often rooted in prejudice and disgust; the veil of privacy may provide 
a more palatable, less controversial means of challenging the sharing 
of bathrooms.  Sharing a bathroom with a transgender individual 
does not invade the non-transgender individual’s privacy any more 
than sharing a bathroom with a non-transgendered individual.
When an individual expresses gender identity in a non-
conforming manner, courts balance the interests of transgendered 
individuals with those of non-transgendered individuals, which often 
results in a loss for transgender litigants.  In Goins v. West Group, Inc., 
109 Id. 
110 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987). 
111 A great deal of transgender litigation with regards to bathroom access involves equal pro-
tection claims, especially in the employment context.  See generally Diana Elkind, Com-
ment, The Constitutional Implications of Bathroom Access Based on Gender Identity:  An Examina-
tion of Recent Developments Paving the Way for the Next Frontier of Equal Protection, 9 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 895, 895–96, 905 n.52 (2007) (providing an overview of cases dealing with 
bathroom access for transgender individuals and the general denial of protection). 
112 GENIUS INDEX, supra note 17, at 6. 
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the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that denying Goins, a trans-
gender employee, access to the women’s restroom at work did not vi-
olate the Minnesota Human Rights Act.113  After female employees 
expressed uneasiness about sharing a restroom with a “male,” the 
company decided to implement a restroom policy designated by bio-
logical gender.114  Although there was no dispute that Goins consis-
tently presented herself as a woman, the company explained its deci-
sion to require Goins to use a single-occupancy restroom as an 
attempt to accommodate both Goins and the female employees.115  
Goins’s discrimination claim was “predicated on her self-image as a 
woman that is or is perceived to be inconsistent with her biological 
gender.”116  The court determined that the employer’s designation of 
bathroom use by biological gender did not constitute discrimination 
in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act.117  “[T]he tradi-
tional and accepted practice in the employment setting is to provide 
restroom facilities that reflect the cultural preference for restroom des-
ignation based on biological gender.”118  The court explained that 
while the Minnesota Human Rights Act “protect[s] her right to be 
provided an adequate and sanitary restroom,” it “does not go so far as 
to protect Goins’ choice of restroom use.”119
In her analysis of Goins, Elaine Craig explained that the dispute 
was “over whose definition of gender should govern.”120 She elabo-
rated that courts “tend towards a balancing of interests analysis—
weighing the interests of female born women with those of trans-
women—and unfortunately, under this analysis, the transsexual liti-
gants tend to lose.”121  In Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, Etsitty, a pre-
operative transgender woman, was fired because the company was 
concerned about potential liability from co-workers, customers, and 
the general public that might have resulted from Etsitty’s use of a fe-
113 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001). 
114 See id. at 721. 
115 See id. 
116 Id. at 722. 
117 Id. at 725; see also Hispanic AIDS Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 839 N.Y.S.2d 691, 696–97 
(2007) (“[B]arring transgender persons from using the public bathrooms that do not 
correspond to their biological sexual assignment does not constitute discrimination.”). 
118 Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 723 (emphasis added). 
119 Id. at 723 n.2. 
120 Craig, supra note 32, at 170 (explaining that the court was essentially asking whether 
Goins was “woman enough” to use the women’s restroom). 
121 Id. at 170–71.  The argument that courts are balancing transgender and non-transgender 
interests will be further explored infra Part VI.C. 
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male restroom.122  In addition to determining that Etsitty could not 
claim Title VII protection based on her transsexuality,123 the court 
emphasized that “[t]here is no evidence that the defendants required 
Plaintiff’s appearance to conform to a particular gender stereotype, 
only that they required her ‘to conform to the accepted principles es-
tablished for gender-distinct public restrooms.’”124  The court ex-
plained that this requirement provided a “legitimate non-
discriminatory reason” for Etsitty’s dismissal, especially because 
“[c]oncerns about privacy, safety and propriety are the reason that 
gender specific restrooms are universally accepted in our society.”125
The non-transgendered individual’s privacy claims are not always 
winning.  In Cruzan v. Special School District, # 1, Cruzan, a teacher at a 
public high school, filed a discrimination claim against the school for 
allowing a transgendered employee to use the women’s restroom.126  
Cruzan expressed concerns about her personal privacy, but the court 
concluded that the school’s accommodation of the transgendered 
employee was not enough to establish an adverse employment 
claim.127  The transgender employee’s use of the female staff rest-
room did not affect Cruzan’s title, salary, or benefits.  The court rea-
soned that the school had alternative restroom options for Cruzan, 
including the female students’ restroom and single-stall unisex bath-
rooms.128  The Eighth Circuit’s suggestion that the employer may of-
fer the complaining employee an alternative accommodation is not as 
simple in the university housing context.  The university’s answer may 
be to move the complaining non-transgendered individual to a dif-
ferent accommodation, such as a single room, similar to the single-
occupancy bathroom in Cruzan. 
Courts have justified sex segregated bathrooms on the basis of cul-
tural practice and traditional interpretation of the term “sex.”  Pri-
vacy concerns are also implicit in the analysis in the bathroom access 
cases, as noted in Etsitty and Cruzan.  In Sommers v. Budget Marketing, 
122 2005 WL 1505610, at *1–2 (D. Utah 2005), aff’d, 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding 
that the UTA’s reasons for discharging Etsitty were legitimate and nondiscriminatory). 
123 See id. at *3; see also Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085–87 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(concluding that transsexuals were not protected under Title VII on the grounds that 
reasonable statutory interpretation indicates that the term “sex” should be interpreted 
according to its “ordinary, common meaning” and, therefore, means “biological male or 
biological female”). 
124 Etsitty, 2005 WL 1505610, at *6 (quoting Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 
1000 (N.D. Ohio 2003)). 
125 Id. at *7. 
126 294 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2002). 
127 Id. at 984. 
128 Id. 
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Inc., the Eighth Circuit recognized the tension between accommodat-
ing a transgendered employee’s needs and the employer’s interest in 
“protecting the privacy interests of its female employees.”129  In bal-
ancing transgender and non-transgender individuals’ rights and rec-
ognizing privacy interests, courts are engaging in an analysis that im-
plicates a central question:  What is one’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a public bathroom?  Diana Elkind suggests that “multi-user 
restrooms are not a place where individuals typically have a high ex-
pectation of privacy.”130  There is no option of not sharing such public 
spaces and, therefore, individuals have a limited expectation of pri-
vacy.131  While a non-transgender individual may fear a loss of privacy 
in the bathroom, a transgendered individual “does not seem to in-
vade one’s privacy any more than anyone else who shares the public 
restroom.”132
In evaluating privacy claims, courts must consider the context and 
the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.133  Such contextual 
analysis is complicated in public university housing in which bath-
room access and living spaces are shared.  What is one’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a university residence hall and a university 
dorm room?  It would seem that within one’s dorm room, an individ-
ual would have a heightened expectation of privacy, for it is one’s 
personal space.  However, if a student chooses to live in a non-single 
option, has that student accepted a living situation in which he or she 
has a more limited expectation of privacy? Based on this rationale, a 
non-transgender student who chooses to live in non-single university 
129 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982). 
130 Elkind, supra note 111, at 925 (citing Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric:  Exam-
ining Transsexual and Judicial Identity, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 370 (1999)). 
131 See Keller, supra note 130, at 370. 
132 Id. 
133 The concept of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” is found in Fourth Amendment case 
law.  In Katz v. United States, the Court held that an enclosed phone booth, like a home, is 
an area in which a person has a constitutionally protected “reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.”  389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  Justice Harlan’s concurrence 
set out a two-prong test for evaluating privacy claims:  (1) actual subjective expectation of 
privacy; and (2) reasonable expectation of privacy.  Id. at 361.  The second prong entails a 
balancing test in which the court weighs the government’s interest in invading the indi-
vidual’s privacy against the individual’s privacy interest in non-invasion.  While the privacy 
rights implicated under Fourth Amendment analysis are distinguishable, cases evaluating 
whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in different situations high-
light the importance of looking at the specific circumstances at hand.  See, e.g., California 
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that the Fourth Amendment was not violated by 
a naked-eye aerial observation of defendant’s backyard); Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 
978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (finding that an employee who lacks a complete expectation of 
privacy in a workplace conversation may still recover under the tort of intrusion).
1238 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:4 
 
 
housing accepts the notion of shared privacy.  Why does living with a 
transgender student invade his or her privacy any more than sharing 
a dorm room with a non-transgendered individual?  Furthermore, 
one’s expectation of privacy is greatly reduced in a dorm hall and a 
bathroom. Such claims appear to be grounded in prejudice against 
and unfamiliarity with individuals who express gender identity in a 
non-conforming manner.  Privacy becomes a pretext for prejudice.  
Exposing this prejudice provides support for transgender individuals’ 
claims to gain access to housing according to self-identified gender. 
B. Safety Concerns 
Privacy is not a winning argument for maintaining sex segregated 
housing.  Instead, as discussed in the bathroom access cases, sex seg-
regated public facilities are maintained on other rationales, including 
comfort, safety, and propriety.  These justifications may be enough 
for universities to rationalize the status quo. 
The importance of feeling comfortable in one’s living space is tan-
tamount for all college students.  The negative backlash against 
transgendered people stems from the fact that transgender individu-
als disrupt normative understanding of gender identity.  This is espe-
cially anxiety-provoking in the housing context because we under-
stand our own gender through relational processes and social 
interaction.134  A great deal of discomfort stems from the fact that 
some transgender students, those who are pre- or non-operative, have 
opposite genitalia, which raises modesty and safety concerns, as well 
as fear of violence and sexual predation.  Transgender individuals are 
often perceived as “sexual predators.”135  This prejudice contributes 
to the hard-to-explain, yet underlying fear of living with transgen-
dered individuals.  However, the likelihood of committing sexually 
violent crimes or predatory acts is not increased because one’s genita-
lia do not match one’s biological sex.136  The prejudice that trans-
gender individuals are more likely to engage in sexually predatory 
acts is unfounded and to base university policy on such a sweeping 
generalization would give effect to private prejudice. 
134 See generally Craig, supra note 32, at 141 (arguing that gender is created in a “relational 
interpretive manner” and that gender identity is the result of biological and psychological 
processes as well as social and cultural interactions). 
135 Telephone Interview with Kathryn L. Stewart, supra note 12. 
136 Elkind, supra note 111, at 925 n.170 (“[F]ear of sexual predators is not a sufficient reason 
to prohibit bathroom access based on gender identity.”). 
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Some individuals may assert that sex segregated housing would 
promote the safety of transgender students, especially those who are 
pre- or non-operative or do not “pass.”137  The argument is that it 
would be more dangerous to place a transgender student who was 
born a “male,” and “looks” like a male but identifies as female, with a 
female.  Sex segregated placement would dictate that the pre- or non-
operative “male” student be placed with a male.  Arguably, by not 
throwing the transgender student into the lion’s den, housing offi-
cials would avoid arrangements that create discomfort for many non-
transgender students and potentially aggressive reactions against 
transgender students.   
This claim is insensitive to the individual’s self-defined gender 
identity, the individualized nature of the transgender experience, 
and the economic realities of sex reassignment surgery.138  It seems 
unfair to require the transgender student from the above scenario to 
live in a male hall if he intends to live his life as a female.  This Com-
ment suggests that such a transgender student might be at a higher 
risk in male housing because of the violent reactions to gender non-
conforming identity and expression.  It does not necessarily follow 
that the non-transgender student is likely to be a victim of a sexually 
predatory act because she is housed with a transgender individual of 
a different birth sex. 
Nevertheless, the fear of liability may be enough for universities to 
justify the continuation of traditional sex segregated housing.139  Uni-
versities defend sex segregated living based on the fact that it has 
worked, it is traditional practice, and, most importantly, it furthers 
the legitimate state interest of protecting the safety of the general 
student body. 
This Section highlights the complexity of the issues confronting 
transgendered individuals in university housing, especially involving 
privacy concerns that encompass a plethora of questions, including 
137 “Passing” refers to “[s]uccessfully assuming a gender role different than the one assigned 
to a person based on biological sex when interacting with society.”  SIRAGUSA, supra note 
12, at 4. 
138 It is also important to note the psychological ramifications on transgender students.  A 
qualitative study examining the perspectives of transgender college students demon-
strated that study participants, who lived part time as their self-identified gender, felt that 
the reaction of others reinforced their feelings of not being normal, while students who 
lived full time as their self-identified gender had a greater feeling of normalcy.  Rob S. 
Pusch, Objects of Curiosity:  Transgender College Students’ Perceptions of the Reactions of Others, 3 
J. GAY & LESBIAN ISSUES IN EDUC. 45 (2005). 
139 See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 2005 WL 1505610 (D. Utah 2005) (holding that UTA’s 
reasons for discharging Etsitty were legitimate and nondiscriminatory). 
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safety, modesty, and propriety.  Transgender individuals often face a 
lack of awareness in the legal system, and judges are often unfamiliar 
with transgender issues.140  While universities must act in the interests 
of the general student body, the rights of the majority, the non-
transgender community, must not take precedence over the minority.  
Both the prison and bathroom access cases suggest the tendency to 
prioritize the comfort and security of traditionally gendered persons.  
Universities should seek housing policies that resist the reproduction 
of this tendency.  This Comment contends that the lack of trans-
gender friendly housing policies may be the result of prejudice and 
unfamiliarity and, therefore, public universities should not be exempt 
from creating alternative housing options.  It is not only non-
transgender students who may cite safety concerns—transgender in-
dividuals are also victims of violent acts.  The notion that transgender 
individuals have deceived others about their “real” gender identity as-
signed at birth can be explosive.141
C.  Privacy:  Informational Interest 
The informational right to privacy “protects an individual’s right 
to control the nature and extent of information released about that 
individual.”142  The informational zone of privacy protects informa-
tion about “one’s medical conditions”143 and “one’s body itself.”144  
“Information about one’s body and state of health is matter which the 
individual is ordinarily entitled to retain within the private enclave 
140 See Telephone Interview with Kathryn L. Stewart, supra note 12 (stating that there are few 
proven, successful legal strategies for transgender litigants, but the likelihood of success 
takes a hit when strong privacy interests are at stake); see also Gilden, supra note 32, at 86 
(describing legal discourse surrounding gender and transgender individuals as limiting); 
Romeo, supra note 37, 719–38 (examining the inadequacy of models of gender used by 
courts); Vade, supra note 32, at 260 (explaining that transgender individuals tend to win 
in the courts when they fit within narrower definitions of transgender). 
141 See Vade, supra note 32, at 263 (explaining that physical danger often results because the 
“perpetrator feels that the transgender person has deceived them”). 
142 Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 683 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 
599–600 (1977)). 
143 Kastl v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. Civ.02-1531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954, 
at *5 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004); see also Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 551 
(9th Cir. 2004) (“Individuals have a constitutionally protected interest in avoiding disclo-
sure of personal matters, including medical information.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
144 Kastl, 2004 WL 2008954, at *5. 
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where he may lead a private life.”145  The right to privacy also encom-
passes information about one’s genitalia.146
In evaluating transgendered individuals’ claims to the right of pri-
vacy pertaining to medical information, not only are the interests of 
transgender and non-transgender individuals often construed as 
competing, but the courts must also take the asserted state interests 
into account.  Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, state action that infringes upon fundamental privacy 
rights may be upheld only when the government action furthers a 
compelling state interest.147  In Bloch v. Ribar, the Sixth Circuit articu-
lated a two-step process for analyzing informational right to privacy 
claims:  (1) the interest at stake must implicate a fundamental per-
sonal right or a right that is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty; 
and (2) the court must balance the government’s interest in dissemi-
nating information against the individual’s interest in keeping the in-
formation private.148
In Kastl v. Maricopa Community College, the court determined that 
the right to privacy in personal information was implicated when the 
defendant demanded that Kastl reveal information about her genita-
lia.149  The plaintiff, a male to female transgender who described her-
self as a “biological female incorrectly assigned to the male sex at 
birth,” claimed that her employer violated Title VII by requiring her 
to use the men’s restroom until proof of completed sex reassignment 
surgery.150  The court identified the issue as whether an employer is 
allowed to require a biologically female employee, who was believed 
to have “stereotypically male traits,” to provide proof that she did not 
have male genitalia.151
The state’s justification for sex segregated bathrooms was based 
on the safety and privacy of other women using the bathroom.152  
Characterizing this rationale as baseless, the court determined that 
the demand for information regarding the plaintiff’s genitalia was 
145 United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (internal qu-
otation marks omitted); see also Bloch, 156 F.3d at 685 (“Our sexuality and choices about 
sex . . . are interests of an intimate nature which define significant portions of our per-
sonhood.  Publically revealing information regarding these interests exposes an aspect of 
our lives that we regard as highly personal and private.”); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591–93 
(concluding that patients possessed a right to privacy in medical records). 
146 Kastl, 2004 WL 2008954, at *5. 
147 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 929 (1992). 
148 Bloch, 156 F.3d at 684 (citing J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090–91 (6th Cir. 1981)). 
149 Kastl, 2004 WL 2008954, at *1. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at *2. 
152 Id. at *6. 
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not necessary or narrowly tailored when her sex had been estab-
lished.153  The court reasoned that “genitalia is not the sole indicator 
of sex,” the plaintiff “lives and presents herself as a woman,” and it 
was unconstitutional to require the plaintiff to provide proof that she 
lacked male genitalia.154  While acknowledging that information re-
garding genitalia may be helpful for sex specific restroom assign-
ments, the court stated that “reliance on that information to the ex-
clusion of other offers of proof might lead to inaccurate 
determinations of sex.”155  The court concluded that the Plaintiff’s 
equal protection claim survived the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
because she “stated facts [that overcame] the presumption of ration-
ality applied to government classifications.”156  Nevertheless, this legal 
victory for transgendered individuals was significantly frustrated when 
the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.157  
The court recognized the right to informational privacy, but noted 
that the right is conditional and “may be infringed upon a showing of 
proper governmental interest.”158  In response to the defendant’s ar-
gument that the policy of sex segregated bathrooms was justified by 
“a compelling interest in protecting the privacy rights of other indi-
viduals,” the Plaintiff asserted her significant interest in maintaining 
her privacy with regards to her genitals and general medical condi-
tion.159  The court dismissed the action because she “presented no 
evidence creating an issue of fact related to her privacy rights.”160
The court left open the question of whether protecting the pri-
vacy interests of the non-transgendered individuals justified the in-
fringement on the Plaintiff’s privacy interest in medical information.  
The arguments pit the privacy claims of transgendered individuals 
against those of non-transgendered individuals.  The state interests 
behind the sex segregated public facility are also thrown into the bal-
ancing analysis.  However, the danger in the balancing analysis is that 
it empowers courts to say that the results are important enough to 
153 Id. (“Were this information truly necessary to preserve the single-sex nature of Defen-
dant’s restrooms and the safety and privacy of their users, surely it would be sought from 
each person prior to granting restroom access.”). 
154 Id.  The court explained that the plaintiff’s personal physician determined that she was 
biologically female, that the plaintiff had legally changed her name to a traditionally fe-
male name and had changed her sex designation on her license.  Id. at *1. 
155 Id. at *6. 
156 Id. at *8. 
157 Kastl v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. CV-02-1531-PHX-SRB, 2006 WL 2460636, 
at *8 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006). 
158 Id. at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
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justify the intrusion on privacy rights.  Balancing, therefore, becomes 
an evaluation of how passionate courts are about the stated results 
and a means to maintain the status quo. 
This has interesting implications in the university housing con-
text, for as discussed in Part B, public universities can legitimize sex 
segregated housing policy on claims of safety.  On the other hand, an 
individual’s interest in medical information is significant.  Consider 
this scenario:  A pre-operative transgender student who self-identifies 
as a woman and physically looks like a woman is assigned to live with 
a male roommate because of her genitalia.  Isn’t the transgender stu-
dent being forced to divulge information as to what is underneath 
her clothing?  If an individual claims a specific gender identity, is it 
fair that the university require proof of genitalia?  Is the university en-
titled to medical information about where a transgendered individual 
is in the process of transitioning?   
The university might claim a right to such private medical infor-
mation for safety reasons.  University housing authorities have limited 
information when they make housing assignments.  The university 
might claim that it is eliminating one potentially dangerous variable.  
While this response serves to further stigmatize transgender individu-
als, the state interests behind sex segregated public housing facilities 
may outweigh the privacy interest in medical information and pro-
vide an argument for universities to justify the continuation of hous-
ing according to traditional gender definitions. 
V. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
Freedom of association raises interesting questions regarding the 
right to define one’s identity and the right to not associate with 
transgender individuals.  Similar to the privacy context, First 
Amendment jurisprudence often adopts a balancing analysis.  Stu-
dents’ claims under the First Amendment’s freedom of association, 
both intimate and expressive, should be recognized as legitimate, but 
will ultimately fail in the educational context because universities’ au-
thority to make housing assignments is justified by the state’s compel-
ling interests in ensuring administrative efficiency and supporting its 
educational philosophy. 
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Supreme Court stated that the 
Constitution protects the freedom of association in “two distinct 
senses”:  “freedom of intimate association” and “freedom of expres-
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sive association.”161  In describing the freedom of intimate association 
as protecting a “fundamental element of personal liberty,” Justice 
Brennan said that “choices to enter into and maintain certain inti-
mate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion 
by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding 
the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional 
scheme.”162  The Court emphasized that close relationships deserve 
protection from state interference in order to “safeguard[] the ability 
independently to define one’s identity that is central to any concept 
of liberty.”163  The Court noted that family relationships exemplify the 
intimate freedom of association,164 but stated that outside of family 
relationships, there exists a “broad range of human relationships that 
may make greater or lesser claims to constitutional protection from 
particular incursions by the State.”165   
The Jaycees, a national organization of young men, claimed that 
the freedom of association protected their right to exclude women 
and to be a group where men associated with one another.166  The 
Jaycees’ claims did not prevail under the Court’s freedom of intimate 
association analysis.  The Court concluded that the Jaycees were out-
side of the category of highly personal relationships that merit consti-
tutional protection after considering various factors, including size, 
purpose, policies, selectivity, and congeniality.167
Expressive association, the second category within the freedom of 
association analysis, focuses on the right to associate for the purpose 
of engaging in certain activities, including speech.168  Justice Bren-
nan’s reading of expressive association in Jaycees considered the asso-
ciation itself as an expression of one’s views.  The Jaycees claimed 
that the Minnesota Human Rights Act violated its freedom of associa-
tion by forcing it to accept members it did not want.  While the Court 
stated that the freedom of association “presupposes a freedom not to 
associate,” the court emphasized that the freedom of expressive asso-
ciation is not absolute.169  “Infringements on that right may be justi-
fied by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unre-
lated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through 
161 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984). 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 619. 
164 Id. at 619–20. 
165 Id. at 620. 
166 Id. at 613–15. 
167 Id. at 620. 
168 Id. at 618. 
169 Id. at 623. 
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means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”170  The 
Court concluded that the State’s compelling interest in eradicating 
discrimination against women justified enforcement of Minnesota’s 
anti-discrimination law.171
While the majority in Jaycees recognized that the Minnesota Act in-
terfered with the group’s expressive liberty to a degree, the Court en-
gaged in a balancing analysis and determined that the regulation was 
justified by a compelling state interest which outweighed the First 
Amendment right of freedom of association.172  Justice Brennan’s 
analysis in Jaycees suggests a limited recognition of the intrinsic value 
of associations, which contrasts sharply with the Court’s decision in 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, in which freedom of association was held 
to protect the Boy Scouts’ right to exclude an openly gay scout lead-
er.173  The Court stated that a group must engage in some type of ex-
pression in order to merit protection under the First Amendment’s 
expressive associational right.174  In giving deference to the Boy 
Scouts’ definition of their expressive message, the Court concluded 
that expressive associations should not be forced to accept members 
whose presence affects the “group’s ability to advocate public or pri-
vate viewpoints.”175  Similarly, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian 
and Bisexual Group of Boston, the Court recognized the parade organ-
izers’ right to exclude the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual 
Group from the parade, an inherently expressive activity.176  In rec-
ognizing that free speech includes the right to decide what not to say, 
the Court explained that the gay, lesbian and bisexual group could 
not force the parade organizers to carry the group’s message.177
The more limited view of association in Jaycees contrasts sharply 
with the robust reading of association in Dale.  The recognition of the 
liberty to define oneself in a particular way has different implications 
with respect to university housing under a freedom of association 
analysis.  The claims would most likely be asserted by non-
transgendered students who express an interest in not being forced 
to associate with transgendered students within the confines of a 
dorm room.  How far does the right to exclude, as recognized in Dale, 
extend?  Unless one thought one has a constitutional right to choose 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 623–24. 
172 Id. at 626–30. 
173 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
174 Id. at 648. 
175 Id. 
176 515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995). 
177 Id. at 574–75. 
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one’s roommate, which would also implicate the capacity of a room-
mate not to choose you, the associational claim is likely to lose, even 
though the reason invoked for not wanting to associate with a room-
mate is based on sex.  This raises the question of how universities deal 
with students who do not want to live with their assigned roommate 
because of race, religion, or sexuality.  Can an individual opt out of a 
housing situation because he does not like living with a roommate of 
X race?  Does the right of association presuppose the right not to as-
sociate with individuals of Y religion in university housing?  A student 
would generally not be able to get out of an arrangement on these 
grounds and would have to make a request for a housing change.  
This would follow in the case of living with a transgendered individ-
ual. 
An important question to consider is whether one expresses one-
self through one’s living arrangement.  While some may claim choic-
es about the people with whom one shares a living arrangement is 
expressive,178 it should be noted that many students do not express 
themselves through their housing assignments.  The associational 
claim involved would most likely be intimate rather than expressive.  
The Court’s discussion of intimate association in Jaycees highlights the 
importance of defining one’s identity through close relationships.  
Shared living arrangements are a form of intimate association, but 
the question is whether such arrangements are protected under the 
First Amendment.  While there is an associational claim here that is 
relevant, association would not give rise to a claim in a situation 
where a university has the authority to make housing assignments.  In 
first year student housing, for example, students do not make choices 
about their particular roommate, hall, or dorm.  If association con-
cerns who one wants to eat lunch with or go on a march with, as in 
Hurley, a choice is involved.  Such a choice is not implicated in this 
context.  Associational claims do not go to the issue of how universi-
ties make assignments. 
Any challenge to university housing on associational grounds 
would most likely be squelched after considering the state’s compel-
ling interests in administrative efficiency and supporting the univer-
sity’s educational philosophy.  Similar to the Court’s analysis in Jay-
cees, these interests would most likely outweigh First Amendment 
rights.  Furthermore, unlike the cases explored in this Section, non-
transgendered students do not constitute a group, nor do they ex-
178 See generally Messerly, supra note 87 (advocating against government interference with 
individuals’ choices in living arrangements). 
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press a particular message in the housing context to warrant protec-
tion under the First Amendment, as noted in Dale. 
The argument that an individual has a right to not associate would 
be defeated in the context of the educational environment.  While a 
university may justify its policies, and students can get out of uncom-
fortable housing situations, this does not negate the need for univer-
sities to adopt alternative policies. 
VI. ACCOMMODATING TRANSGENDER STUDENT NEEDS 
Universities are given tremendous sway to make decisions in the 
best interest of students’ education.  Universities voice concern about 
protecting the welfare of the general student body, but the diverse 
approaches to the question of transgender students and housing sug-
gest the difficulty of determining the appropriate baseline.  An over-
view of specific university housing policies that attempt to accommo-
date the transgender student population indicates different strategies 
and recent trends.179
A. Universities’ Approaches:  Policies and Trends 
Some universities have adopted policies that support transgender 
students’ quest for safe housing that is true to their gender identity.180  
At the University of California, Riverside, for example, the housing 
policy provides special accommodations for students in keeping with 
their gender identity/expression.181  The student must inform the 
University’s Housing Department of the need for special accommo-
dations and then provide information, which will remain confiden-
tial, so that University Housing staff is able to meet the student’s 
housing needs.182  The University of Minnesota takes a case-by-case 
approach when transgender students want to live in housing with a 
179 See generally TRANSGENDER LAW & POLICY INST., COLLEGES/UNIVERSITIES AND K-12 
SCHOOLS, http://www.transgenderlaw.org/college/index.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) 
[hereinafter TRANSGENDER LAW & POLICY]. 
180 Brett-Genny Janiczek Beemyn, Ways that U.S. Colleges and Universities Meet the Day-to-Day 
Needs of Transgender Students, TRANSGENDER LAW & POLICY INST., 
http://www.transgenderlaw.org/college/guidelines.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
181 University of California, Riverside:  LGBT Resource Center, Housing Policies Related to 
Gender Identity/Expression, http://out.ucr.edu/campus/transpolicy.htm (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2010) [hereinafter Housing Policies] (noting that “Housing consistently recog-
nizes and respects the gender identity that the student has established with University 
Housing”). 
182 Id. (explaining the process by which students with concerns related to their gender iden-
tity/expression may seek special housing accomodations). 
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roommate of the gender with which they identify.183  Students are in-
terviewed by housing authorities, and then the administration deter-
mines the reasons students want to live together and decides whether 
to honor the request.  Nevertheless, the University of Minnesota gen-
erally places transgender students in “apartment style” housing, in 
which they have a private bedroom and bathroom, but share the liv-
ing space with students of their self-identified gender.184  The Univer-
sity of Illinois at Chicago has taken a more liberal approach, making 
room assignments on the basis of a student’s current self-defined 
gender identity.185
One of the most notable trends at the university level has been the 
creation of gender-neutral housing, defined as “[p]roviding the op-
tion for students to room together without restriction based on sex or 
gender.”186  Under this approach, housing authorities assign room-
mates regardless of gender.  The benefits are significant:  Students 
are not required to identify their gender for housing purposes and 
can choose their roommates or have their roommates assigned to 
them without consideration of gender or sex.  Universities have taken 
different approaches to gender-neutral housing, designating individ-
ual suites, halls, floors, buildings, areas of buildings, or most of the 
residence hall as gender-neutral.187  In 2008, thirty-six colleges and 
universities offered gender-neutral housing.188  Oberlin College, for 
example, has created ‘all gender’ floors.  Wesleyan University estab-
lished a hallway for students who chose not to designate their gender.  
Out of concerns of segregation of transgendered students, Wesleyan 
replaced this gender-neutral hallway policy with the current policy of 
matching returning students who choose the gender-neutral housing 
option.189
Some universities allow students to apply for gender-neutral hous-
ing individually.  The University of California, Riverside, for example, 
asks a student to check if both roommates request or are open to a 
183 Nat’l Consortium of Directors of LGBT Res. in Higher Educ., FAQs:  What Policies Can 
Be Put into Place to Accommodate Transgendered Students in Campus Housing,  
http://www.lgbtcampus.org/old_faq/trans_campus_housing.html (last visited Mar. 28, 




186 GENIUS INDEX, supra note 17, at 3. 
187 See TRANSGENDER LAW & POLICY, supra note 179. 
188 NATIONAL STUDENT GENDERBLIND CAMPAIGN, RESEARCH UPDATE—SUMMER 2008, 
http://www.genderblind.org/research.pdf (listing colleges and universities that offer 
gender-neutral rooming) [hereinafter RESEARCH UPDATE]. 
189 Id. at 8. 
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gender-neutral housing placement.190  If a student alone is open to 
gender-neutral housing, but does not have a roommate, the Univer-
sity may contact the individual and make roommate assignments 
based on compatibility evaluations and follow-up interviews.191  Other 
universities require individuals who want to live in gender-neutral 
housing to apply with a specific roommate.  At the University of Penn-
sylvania [hereinafter Penn], upper class students (sophomores, jun-
iors, and seniors), who are over the age of eighteen, may apply to live 
in gender-neutral housing with a roommate, who can be of any gen-
der.192
Another transgender-friendly housing option is lesbian, gay, bi-
sexual, transgender, and ally living-learning programs or theme floors 
or houses, which have been established in over twelve colleges and 
universities.193  For example, the University of Minnesota established 
Lavender House for students interested in gender-related issues, pro-
viding students with the option of choosing their housing and pro-
gramming around gender identity and sexual orientation themes.194  
At the University of California, Berkeley, the Unity Theme House 
provides a “mixed gender roommate” option open to all students, 
who can identify with any gender and need not provide official 
documentation.195
The housing policies of two universities in Pennsylvania demon-
strate the breadth of approaches.  Erin Cross, Associate Director of 
the Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Center at Penn, explained the 
steps of Penn’s housing process.196  Penn makes a series of accommo-
dations for sophomores through seniors.  Upperclassmen can choose 
to live in gender-neutral housing.  If students do not make this 
choice, the default is to place a student with someone of the same 
“gender.”  Students who are eighteen or older can self-identify as 
gender-variant and must contact College Houses and Academic Ser-
190 GENDER NEUTRAL HOUSING:  A PROPOSAL FOR OCCIDENTAL COLLEGE, slide 27, available at 
http://clubs.oxy.edu/asoc/files/GA%20files/GenderNeutralHousing.ppt.
191 See University of California, Riverside, LGBT Resource Center, Gender Neutral Housing 
Option, http://out.ucr.edu/campus/gnhousing.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
192 RESEARCH UPDATE, supra note 188, at 6. 
193 TRANSGENDER LAW & POLICY, supra note 179 (including the University of California at 
Berkeley, Davis, Irvine, Riverside, Santa Barbara; the University of Colorado, Boulder; the 
University of Iowa; the University of Massachusetts; the University of Minnesota; and the 
University of Vermont). 
194 University of Minnesota, Living Learning Communities, http://www.housing.umn.edu 
/student/llc/index.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
195 RESEARCH UPDATE, supra note 188, at 6. 
196 Interview with Erin Cross, Assoc. Dir., Univ. of Pa. Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender 
Ctr., in Phila., Pa. (Dec. 18, 2008). 
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vices (CHAS) when choosing their housing.  This will lead to a series 
of conference calls to determine the best fit.  If the individual has 
taken hormones or has had sexual reassignment surgery, Penn Hous-
ing tends to be more favorable to the gender towards which the indi-
vidual is moving.  Ms. Cross explained that this process is a “mess” for 
first year students, especially for those under eighteen, unless the 
parent gives the student permission to go through the same process 
with CHAS.  She described the process as discretionary and stated 
that it is not usual for a pre-operative transgender to live with some-
one of the opposite sex. 
In contrast to Penn, Arcadia University in suburban Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, has not adopted gender-neutral housing.  Joshua Stern, 
Dean of Students and former Director of Residence Life, explained 
that while Arcadia has formed a working group to look at how the 
University responds to transgendered students, Arcadia is committed 
to housing students of the same sex together during freshman year.197  
Upper class students have coed housing options available in the form 
of coed suites or apartments, which he suggested provides some 
flexibility for transgender students.  Students indicate their sex on 
their housing preference forms.  Stern explained that if a self-defined 
female student who is biologically male is placed with a female, the 
University would most likely reassign the student and house the stu-
dent with a male.  If the student was not comfortable, he suggested 
that the University would do its best to accommodate the student, 
perhaps through the use of a single.  Whether the student would be 
placed in a single on the male or female wing remained a compli-
cated, unanswered question. 
B. The Future of University Housing Policies 
Although more universities are taking measures to ameliorate the 
housing situation for transgender students, the housing policies are 
replete with complexities and complications.  Many universities deal 
with housing issues on a case-by-case approach, leaving universities 
without a settled, standard campus-wide policy.  Crafting an individu-
alized solution is difficult when residence halls are segregated by tra-
ditional sex identity. 
Placing transgendered students in singles is often offered as the 
default solution.  The single room as the only remedy is problematic 
because transgendered students may feel isolated.  Singles are also 
197 Telephone Interview with Joshua L. Stern, Dean of Students and former Dir. of Resi-
dence Life, Arcadia Univ. (Jan. 8, 2009). 
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more expensive.  According to Erin Cross, a single room at Penn 
costs more because the student has to pay a “single supplement.”198  
The single supplement is waived for medical necessities, but Gender 
Identity Disorder does not qualify an individual for a medical sin-
gle.199  The converse solution—transgendered buildings or areas of 
buildings—is also problematic because it assumes that transgender 
students want to live with other transgender students; thus, this solu-
tion may have a “ghettoization” effect. 
Universities have various justifications for maintaining the status 
quo, especially because students can request to get out of a living 
situation in which they are uncomfortable.200  While sex segregated 
housing should remain an option, various alternatives are advisable, 
and, in fact, should be constitutionally required for public universi-
ties.  This Comment examines claims that transgender and non-
transgender students may raise in traditional sex segregated housing 
and ultimately finds that safety and educational concerns may allow 
universities to continue traditional policies.  Nevertheless, public uni-
versities have a legal duty to provide non-traditional, non-sex segre-
gated housing so that transgender and other gender non-conforming 
students have comfortable and safe options.  The provision of only 
sex segregated housing neglects modern realities and changing con-
ceptions of gender identity and requires heightened scrutiny.  There 
is a strong argument that transgender individuals represent a pro-
tected class and, as a result, universities must provide alternative 
housing options on equal protection grounds.201
Options that would grant transgender students access to housing 
according to self-defined gender identity, such as gender-neutral 
housing, would not disrupt traditional sex-segregated housing, but 
would be in addition to existing policies.  The constitutional right to 
self-define gender should be considered a fundamental liberty right 
and should be extended to students in university housing under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.202  Although the 
right to gender self-determination is complicated in the university 
198 Interview with Erin Cross, supra note 196. 
199 Id. 
200 See, e.g., Housing Policies, supra note 181 (providing that if a student has a conflict with a 
roommate because of gender identity/expression, Housing recommends that the student 
speak with the Resident Director, who is trained on gender identity/expression issues, 
and if the issue remains unresolved, the next step is to speak with senior Residence Life 
staff and/or the Director of the LGBT Resource Center). 
201 This argument is beyond the scope of this comment.  See, e.g., Elkind, supra note 111, at 
902 (arguing that the transgender community should be treated as a suspect class).
202 See supra Part III. 
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housing context, it is possible for universities to achieve housing poli-
cies that recognize and address this right.  Since the “right to define 
one’s own concept of existence”203 has been extended to procreation 
decisions and family relationships, as well as private sexual choices,204 
why should this right not be extended to transgender individuals in 
the university housing forum?  In this context, regulation is needed 
to ensure that transgender individuals can make “choices central to 
personal dignity and autonomy.”205
The remainder of this Section presents housing alternatives and 
solutions.  The specific strategy adopted by a university cannot be 
mandated, but the university must provide an appropriate accommo-
dation.206
Gender-neutral housing is an important development because it 
enables students to live with a roommate of any gender, but generally 
is an option limited to upperclassmen.207  Universities should extend 
this option to all students, an approach that has been adopted at the 
University of California, Riverside; California Institute of Technology; 
and Skidmore College.208  This option should be clearly indicated on 
housing forms for students of all years.  If roommate assignments are 
based on factors other than perceived gender, transgender students 
will feel less stigmatized with regards to university housing. 
Gender-neutral housing should be available to students who apply 
for this option with a specific roommate, as well as to students who 
have not yet identified a roommate.  To facilitate this option, univer-
sities would follow-up with students to help find compatible room-
mates and create a database of students who consent to living with 
transgender students.  At Michigan State University, the LGBT Re-
source Center has a list of “LGBT-friendly” students to assist Housing 
203 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
204 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003). 
205 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
206 The argument that universities have a duty to provide such alternatives is supported by 
the case of the “Yale Five,” in which the district and circuit courts upheld Yale’s on-
campus housing requirement.  Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 16 F. Supp. 2d 
183 (D. Conn. 1998), aff’d, 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000).  It should be emphasized that Or-
thodox students have the option of single sex floors in specified Yale residences, an alter-
native that seems to accommodate religious needs.  See Glaberson, supra note 95 (explain-
ing the problems Orthodox students have with the University’s different housing 
options).  In the same vein, non-sex segregated housing options provide an alternative 
that accommodates transender students’ needs. 
207 RESEARCH UPDATE, supra note 188 (citing Brandeis University, Brown University, Dart-
mouth College, Guilford College, Oregon State University, University of Pennsylvania, 
Stanford University, Swarthmore College, Washington University, and Wesleyan Univer-
sity). 
208 Id. 
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authorities in making roommate and suitemate assignments.209  Sur-
veying students to determine more tolerant placements may be ad-
ministratively challenging, but the benefits would be far-reaching.  To 
get at the root of the problem, universities should include a “non-
binary gender question”210 on housing forms and should not require 
proof of surgery or official documentation.  Other appealing solu-
tions include eliminating the requirement of filling out gender on 
housing forms and giving students the option of not indicating a 
gender preference when making roommate requests.211
Another option may be the negotiation of formal roommate 
agreements.  At the University of Minnesota, roommates sit down 
with their Community Advisor, an upper class student who is trained 
to work with students living in university housing, and make a formal 
roommate agreement looking at issues such as study and sleeping 
habits, communication, and cleaning duties.212  Students resolve con-
flicts through the Community Advisor and then turn to the Residence 
Director and the Assistant Director of Residential Life to discuss the 
possibility of moving.213  Just as all roommates make agreements for 
day-to-day living, non-transgender and transgender individuals living 
as roommates can negotiate interactions for optimal living arrange-
ments. 
The role of the Community Advisor at the University of Minnesota 
suggests the importance of education to help ensure that change be-
gins with university officials.214  It is critical that universities adopt 
policies that are sensitive to the needs of transgendered students, but 
209 Michigan State University, Transgender Student Housing at Michigan State University, 
http://transgenderhousing.msu.edu/FAQ.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
210 Beemyn & Pettitt, supra note 15 (indicating that seven of the twenty-five surveyed college 
campuses used a “non-binary gender question” on housing, admissions, or health care 
forms, giving students the option to self-identify outside of the gender binary by leaving a 
blank space after the term “gender” rather than using a check box). 
211 See generally RESEARCH UPDATE, supra note 188.  At Pitzer College, filling out gender is not 
required on housing forms, and all students, including first-years, have the option to spe-
cify their roommate’s gender.  Id. at 5.  Starting in the Spring of 2008, housing forms at 
Harvard University included a transgender checkbox.  Id. at 4.  At Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity, students either select male, female, or no preference when making roommate re-
quests in the housing lottery.  Id. at 2. 
212 Getting Along with Your Roommate, THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, HOUSING AND 
RESIDENTIAL LIFE 2009–2010 GUIDEBOOK, http://www.housing.umn.edu/
guidebook/5/index.html.
213 Id. 
214 See generally Jeffrey S. McKinney, On the Margins:  A Study of the Experiences of Transgender 
College Students, 3 J. GAY & LESBIAN ISSUES IN EDUC. 63 (2005) (explaining that self-
identified transgender college students reported a hostile environment for transgender 
students and a lack of resources and education on transgender issues). 
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this represents an initial step that may be limited in effect if educa-
tion and training do not reinforce policy.  In fact, such education 
may be necessary to spur change at universities that have ineffective 
policies, as well as at universities that have not considered or have 
dismissed the need for changing housing plans.  Training university 
and housing department administrators to make individualized 
judgments that determine the best placement for transgender stu-
dents is critical.  Exposing faculty and students to the issues affecting 
transgendered students is an integral part of campus-wide educa-
tional efforts.  For example, universities could tie in gender-related 
topics in programming and housing. 
The solutions to such housing predicaments are not easy.  Univer-
sities need to shift the burden from the individual student to make 
the housing process as smooth as possible and to provide more ex-
plicit guidelines.  Housing forms should have better choices in terms 
of sex and gender.  Students should have the option to live with 
whom they want, regardless of gender, and should not find that the 
only policy attempting to accommodate the needs of transgender 
students is putting them all together.  Universities have a duty to take 
preemptive measures to protect transgender individuals who feel that 
single-sex housing policies leave them without safe, comfortable, and 
autonomous living options. 
CONCLUSION 
College students are likely to complain about their roommate and 
other aspects of their living arrangements at some point during their 
cohabitation.  When transgender students are thrown into the mix, a 
layer of complexity is added, given the unfamiliarity and discomfort 
with gender non-conforming behavior. 
Students might take issue with being forced to live in a dorm 
room with a transgender individual.  This objection raises larger 
questions:  What if some students don’t want to live with an individual 
because of his or her race, religion, or sexuality?  What prejudices 
should universities accommodate?  Part of the college experience is 
living with all kinds of people.  Just as universities now have housing 
arrangements with interracial roommates, universities need to resist 
the tendency to segregate transgender individuals into transgendered 
dorms or living spaces.  Universities need to take steps to educate 
students who do not want to share a room with a transgender person 
because of discomfort.  Through more education and exposure, uni-
versities can help fight ignorance and unfamiliarity with issues affect-
ing transgender individuals. 
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Kourt Osborn was denied access to both female and male hous-
ing.  Universities must adopt policies to ensure that students have ac-
cess to housing that enables them to express their gender identity.  
This Comment does not suggest that the remedy is to prohibit sex se-
gregated housing, but instead to ensure that all public universities 
have non-sex segregated options.  Public universities must implement 
policies that are sensitive to transgender individuals and provide 
them with acceptable housing options. 
 
 
